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What	is	development?	
Abstract:		This	chapter	examines	the	relation	of	the	Human	Development	or	Capability	Approach	to	liberal	political	theory.	If	development	is	enhancement	of	capabilities,	then	this	chapter	adds	that	development	is	human	and	social:	development	includes	(1)	the	creation	of	value	as	a	social	process	that	is	(2)	a	dialectical	product	of	people	in	their	relations.	Specifically:	(1)	The	place	of	the	individual	within	political	theory	must	be	revised	if	the	political	subject	is,	as	Carol	Gould	argues,	an	“individual-in-relations”	rather	than	an	autonomous	individual	agent.	(2)	New	possibilities	for	valuation	are	also	relational:	value	is	created	dialectically	along	with	those	possibilities	through	processes	that	may	be	modeled	on	Denis	Goulet’s	account	of	dialectical	recognition.		These	axiological	claims	hold	importance	for	the	place	of	democratic	participation	in	just	politics	and	development.	Building	upon	David	Crocker’s	work,	this	chapter	argues	that	just	politics	may	require	a	participative	approach	that	is	undercut	by	Martha	Nussbaum’s	suggestion	that	a	list	of	central	capabilities	should	guide	the	drafting	of	national	constitutions.	The	assimilation	of	the	indigenous	concept	sumak	
kawsay	to	the	ideal	of	buen	vivir	within	Ecuador’s	constitution	is	illustrative,	suggesting	that	prior	specification	(a	list)	may	limit	and	distort	the	dialectical	generation	of	new	capabilities.		Keywords:	Capability	Approach,	constitutional	principles,	buen	vivir,	relational	autonomy,	Martha	Nussbaum		
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What	is	development?	We	are	familiar,	by	this	point,	with	what	development	is	not.	It	is	not	gross	national	product,	not	gross	domestic	product	divided	by	a	country’s	population,	not	gross	national	income	per	person.	It	is	not	median	household	income,	the	latest	in	this	family	of	simple	economic	measures	(Rose,	Birdsall	&	Diofasi,	2016).	Philosophers	still	find	it	a	standard	move	to	point	out	the	inadequacy	of	financial	measures	of	development,	well-being	and	human	security	(e.g.,	Nussbaum	2011,	ix);	and	such	repudiation	is	also	common	among	economists,	who	hedge	their	claims	about	the	value	of	financial	measures,	then	proceed	to	rely	upon	them	anyway	(e.g.,	Sundaram,	2016).	This	remains	the	state	of	discussion	even	though	nearly	fifty	years	have	passed	since	development	economist	Dudley	Seers	criticized	his	colleagues’	“continued	addiction”	to	simple	econometrics	and	their	“lip	service”	to	philosophies	of	development.	Seers	continues:	“we	must	ask	ourselves:	what	are	the	necessary	conditions	for	a	universally	accepted	aim,	the	realisation	of	the	potential	of	human	personality?"	(Seers	1969,	1,	3)		 Seers	calls	for	a	theory	of	development;	many	have	since	written	to	present	answers	that	reflect	the	concerns	he	articulates.	His	choice	of	expression,	“the	realisation	of	the	potential	of	human	personality,"	evokes	the	language	of	psychology.	The	current	best	effort	at	such	a	theory,	the	Capability	Approach,	instead	incorporates	language	from	philosophy,	referring	to	liberal	conceptions	of	freedom	and	an	Aristotelian	conception	of	flourishing.	Development	presents	the	parameters	for	such	flourishing,	characterizing	the	expansion	of	freedoms	and	the	creation	of	capabilities	worth	having	as	the	conditions	for	development	of	the	good	life.		 This	chapter	is	not	focused	upon	capabilities,	their	characterization,	or	the	means	to	their	realization,	though	those	topics	will	be	touched	upon	late	in	the	chapter.	It	is	primarily	an	inquiry	into	axiology	–	also	called	the	study	of	value,	or	
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normativity.1	Its	main	proposal	is	simple	enough:	value	is	human	and	social,	so	development	is	human	and	social.	Each	of	these	claims	about	value	requires	elaboration.	First,	value	is	human,	it	is	characteristic	of	dependent,	biological	creatures;	and	second,	it	is	social,	generated	by	humans	within	social	relations	that	involve	such	dependence.	Because	conceiving	of	some	values	involves	social	processes	that	play	out	over	time,	some	revision	of	liberal	political	theory	is	necessary.	The	liberal	tradition	slights	both	relational	characteristics	of	human	life	and	dialectical	aspects	of	value	creation	in	its	characterization	of	the	autonomous	individual	who	stands	as	the	political	subject,	the	subject	of	central	concern	within	its	theories	of	justice.	The	need	for	revision	carries	over	to	treatment	of	political	process	in	the	Capability	Approach;	the	chapter’s	penultimate	section	will	indicate	that	need	as	it	pertains	to	Martha	Nussbaum’s	offering	of	a	list	of	central	capabilities	as	a	guide	to	the	drafting	of	national	constitutions.			 My	argument	draws	particularly	from	Carol	Gould’s	articulation	of	social	ontology,	from	Denis	Goulet’s	account	of	the	dialectic	of	recognition	in	underdevelopment,	and	from	David	Crocker’s	focus	upon	deliberative	democracy.	Given	Crocker’s	role,	the	argument	seems	especially	suited	to	this	volume.	He	began	his	path	toward	understanding	development	more	than	three	decades	ago.	He	was	influenced	particularly	by	Seers’	question,	his	own	early	study	of	humanist	Marxism,	and	Goulet’s	action	and	philosophical	reflection.	Crocker’s	approach	has	since	converged	with	the	Capability	Approach,	and	he	endorses	and	articulates	an	“agency-focused	version	of	capability	ethics”	in	Ethics	of	Global	Development.2	Crocker’s	work	began	especially	as	an	intimate	study	of	the	political	articulation	of	
																																																						1	Joseph	Raz	provides	a	contemporary	account	of	normativity	in	From	Normativity	to	Responsibility	(2011,	1-8).	This	chapter	is	pursued	especially	in	the	spirit	of	Putnam’s	naturalist	account	of	normativity	(2002;	and	see	De	Caro,	“Introduction,”	in	Putnam	2016,	15-16).	I	limit	discussion	to	“human”	development	in	this	chapter	for	simplicity.	Like	Nussbaum,	I	take	subjects	with	standing	for	consideration	in	politics		to	include	those	with	sentience	(2011,	158).	Argument	in	this	chapter	may	suggest	that	subjects	countenanced	within	development	could	include	any	beings	with	which	one	has	relations	that	involve,	or	might	in	future	involve,	mutual	value	relations.	Examples	include	humans,	humans	of	future	generations,	house	cats	and	muskrats,	but	not	extinct	dodos	and	not	objects	such	as	stones	that	we	may	or	may	not	value,	but	that	could	not	themselves	conceive	of	value.	2	Crocker	2008,	1.	For	an	autobiographical	account	of	Crocker’s	developing	relation	to	capability	theory,	see	the	opening	pages	of	the	book.	
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development;	the	following	section	will	show	how	it	continues	to	display	that	focus	after	he	joins	his	thought	with	the	Capability	Approach.		
David	Crocker’s	critical	study	of	development		 David	Crocker’s	contribution	to	the	ethics	and	politics	of	global	development	grew	from	roots	in	critical	theory	and	Latin	American	politics.	His	early	writing	followed	upon	study	in	the	mid-1970’s	with	Belgrade	social	theorists	Mihailo	Marković	and	Svetozar	Stojanović,	who	led	an	intellectual	circle	and	produced	a	journal,	Praxis,	that	aimed	to	create	“a	body	of	thought	which	is	uncompromising	in	its	rejection	of	all	forms	of	human	alienation,	exploitation	oppression	and	injustice,	regardless	of	the	type	of	society	–	bourgeois	or	socialist.”3	A	visiting	professorship	in	Costa	Rica	in	1986-7	allowed	Crocker	a	perch	from	which	to	view	and	reflect	upon	policy	developments,	some	of	which	reflected	what	John	Williamson	would	characterize	late	in	the	decade	as	“the	Washington	Consensus.”	Costa	Rica	was	turning	toward	international	markets	at	the	time	and	reducing	the	state’s	role	in	economic	decisions.	This	was	a	shift	away	from	social	democracy	and	import	substitution	industrialization,	an	economic	strategy	intended	to	limit	a	nation’s	dependence	on	foreign	markets.	Crocker	urged	in	place	of	both	old	and	new	trends	“an	ethically	superior	development	model	that	gives	highest	priority	not	to	economic	growth	but	to	basic	human	needs,	democratic	self-determination,	environmental	respect,	and	the	real	opportunity	for	personal	development.”	(Crocker	1989,	317)	He	named	his	view	“participative	eco-development”;	it	featured	the	abovementioned	four	“fundamental,	normative	principles”	and	allowed	for	the	possibility	of	conceiving	further	dimensions	for	development	theory.4		
																																																						3	Gerson	Sher,	“Tito	Muzzles	the	Loyal	Opposition,”	The	Nation	(New	York,	N.Y.),	March	15,	1975,	294	(quoted	in	Crocker	1983,	1).	4	Crocker	1989,	318,	321.	This	article	is	the	third	of	Crocker’s	opening	trio	for	Revista	de	Filosofía	de	
la	Universidad	de	Costa	Rica,	which	includes	(Crocker	1987)	and	(Crocker	1988).	See	also	the	effective	synthesis	of	these	works	in	(Crocker	1991b)	and	its	companion	piece	(Crocker	1991a).	These	writings	develop	ideas	first	presented	at	the	1984	Symposium	focused	upon	development	at	the	World	Conference	on	Future	Studies	and	the	first	International	Development	Ethics	Association	conference	in	1987	and	1989	(see	Crocker	1991b,	461).	
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	 Crocker	was	one	among	philosophers	from	several	traditions	articulating	new	thinking	on	the	relation	of	human	concerns	to	older	political	and	economic	ideals	of	development.	The	“satisfaction	of	basic	needs,”	which	Crocker	lists	first	among	his	principles,	had	been	introduced	into	international	development	as	an	ideal	at	a	1976	International	Labour	Organization	conference.	The	Basic	Needs	Approach	also	took	root	within	the	United	Nations	agency	charged	with	the	promotion	of	technical	assistance,	the	UN	Development	Program.	Crocker’s	approach,	by	contrast,	focused	upon	harmony	with	the	environment	and	on	democratic	deliberation	in	the	context	of	development.	Alongside	humanist	Marxism,	Crocker	would	find	inspiration	in	American	pragmatism,	especially	due	to	a	summer’s	study	with	Richard	Rorty	in	1979.	These	influences	led	him	to	call	for	a	“development	theory-practice”	focused	upon	both	“insiders”	and	development	workers	as	“partial	insiders,”	rather	than	upon	the	national	and	international	institutions	that	promote	uniform	development	standards	(Crocker	1991b,	459-61,	468-69;	Crocker	1991a).			 The	separation	from	formal	global	institutions	distinguished	Crocker’s	approach	from	Amartya	Sen’s	emerging	paradigm	in	economics	and	philosophy,	the	Capability	Approach.	With	Sen’s	support,	the	approach	was	well	suited	to	find	its	place	within	the	UN	Development	Program,	providing	the	underpinnings	for	its	first	
Human	Development	Report	of	1990.	The	Capability	Approach	would	gain	Martha	Nussbaum’s	attention	and	in	the	late	1980’s	she	would	connect	it	to	her	own	thoughts	on	Marxian	and	Aristotelian	conceptions	of	development	(2000,	70;	2001,	xix).	Nussbaum	conceived	her	exploration	of	capabilities	first	as	the	identification	of	“certain	features	of	our	common	humanity”	(1987,	27)	and	later	also	as	“the	basis	for	fundamental	political	principles	focused	on	the	lives	of	women	in	developing	countries,”	as	she	puts	it	in	Women	and	Human	Development	(2000,	xiii).	This	would	lead	her	to	an	argument	concerning	constitutional	principles,	particularly	detailed	in	Frontiers	of	Justice	(2006)	and	work	thereafter.	Crocker’s	engagement,	by	contrast,	was	grounded	in	“the	cultural	identity	of	groups,	populations,	and	societies,”	with	a	focus	on	their	self-determination	(1991b,	462).	
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	 The	Capability	Approach	in	its	early	development,	then,	was	built	from	economic	philosophy	engaged	with	international	institutions	by	Sen.	Nussbaum	added	an	Aristotelian	theory	married	to	liberalism.	And	Crocker’s	participative	eco-development	approach	arose	from	social	theory	and	engagement	with	peoples	and	development	practitioners.	Crocker’s	distinctive	background	emerges	within	a	reply	to	Nussbaum’s	well-known	proposal	of	a	list	of	the	central	human	capabilities	and	its	use	in	politics	(Crocker	2008,	ch.	6).	I	will	suggest	in	the	next	section	that	the	developmental	path	that	Nussbaum’s	theory	takes,	particularly	over	the	span	from	1987-2007,	may	serve	to	explain	some	characteristics	that	have	left	it	subject	to	Crocker’s	criticism.	Nussbaum	first	discusses	capabilities	in	an	Aristotelian	reply	to	Rawls’s	liberalism	and	she	settles	upon	the	ideal	of	constitutional	guarantees	for	capabilities	later.	As	her	work	develops	from	philosophical	analysis	of	politics	to	claims	about	the	actual	operations	of	government,	and	as	she	particularly	develops	an	account	of	the	function	of	a	constitution	in	a	just	society,	her	proposal	retains	a	specific	role	for	a	philosopher	within	a	political	context	–	and	there’s	the	rub.		
The	development	of	Nussbaum’s	list	and	Crocker’s	critical	rejoinder	Aristotle	serves	Nussbaum	as	a	fruitful	source	for	criticism	of	contemporary	liberal	thinkers	and	in	that	context	his	writing	provides	the	platform	for	her	first	articulation	of	the	capability	approach.	In	“Nature,	Function	and	Capability:	Aristotle	on	Political	Distribution,”	which	first	appears	as	a	1987	working	paper	at	the	United	Nations	University	World	Institute	for	Development	Economics	Research	(UNU-WIDER),	Nussbaum	brings	Aristotle’s	thought	to	bear	on	John	Rawls’	account	of	distributive	justice.	Her	focus	is	upon	wealth	and	worth:		No	item’s	worth	can	be	properly	assessed	if	we	do	not	set	it	in	the	context	of	a	thicker	theory	of	good	living;	and	when	we	do	so,	we	discover	that	wealth	has	no	independent	worth.	Rawls’s	theory,	then,	is	too	thin.	His	list	...	ascribes	independent	significance	to	items	whose	worth	can	only	be	seen	in	connection	with	the	truly	primary	items.	(1987,	10)	Nussbaum’s	analysis	contrasts	those	truly	primary	items,	capabilities,	with	Rawls’	concept	of	primary	goods.	One	primary	good	is	wealth;	other	“social	primary	goods”	
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that	Rawls	notes	show	a	closer	relation	to	the	central	capabilities	that	would	appear	later	in	Nussbaum’s	lists,	as	he	includes	rights,	liberties,	access	to	political	institutions	and	access	to	other	social	institutions	that	support	“the	social	bases	of	self	respect.”5	Nussbaum	characterizes	the	“truly	primary	items”	which	promote	the	“functionings	of	individuals”	as	internal	capabilities	(“I-capabilities”).	These	differ	from	the	“external	conditions	for	those	functionings”	(the	“E-capabilities”),	including	wealth	(1987,	22,	24).	Some	internal	capabilities	may	be	developed	through	external	conditions	afforded	by	the	state	–	through	a	system	of	public	education,	for	example.	Nussbaum	argues	that	“Aristotle	repeatedly	insists	that	one	of	the	legislator's	first	and	most	essential	tasks	is	the	provision	of	an	adequate	scheme	for	the	education	of	the	young”	and	she	generalizes	this	view	to	indicate	the	role	of	the	state	in	the	“development	of	I-capabilities.”	(21)		 “Nature,	Function	and	Capability,”	then,	shifts	the	focus	in	political	theory	from	the	classic	foci	of	distributive	justice	to	the	E-capabilities.	It	introduces	a	discussion	of	the	role	of	the	state	that	develops	greatly	within	Nussbaum’s	writing	over	the	following	two	decades.	The	article	lays	the	ground	for	her	list	of	central	capabilities	in	the	claim	that	“we	need	to	specify	the	list	of	things	that	we	want	people	to	be	capable	of	doing	and	doing	by	their	choice.”	(1987,	12)	Beyond	supporting	external	conditions	for	I-capabilities,	the	role	for	the	legislator	is	not	further	developed	in	the	1987	article,	which,	as	the	title	indicates,	is	a	discussion	of	“Aristotle	on	political	distribution.”	In	the	early	1990’s	Nussbaum	develops	her	list	of	“Basic	Human	Functional	Capabilities”	and	argues	that	ideals	such	as	these	should	“be	the	goal	of	legislation	and	public	planning.”	(1992,	221-222)	Later,	her	claim	is	more	specific:	“the	idea	of	a	threshold	level	of	capabilities,	can	provide	a	basis	for	
																																																						5	A	Theory	of	Justice	[1st	edition,	1971],	62;	and	see	Justice	as	Fairness,	a	Restatement	(2001,	58–59).	In	Restatement,	Rawls	writes	of	“Income	and	wealth,	understood	as	all-purpose	means	(having	an	exchange	value)	generally	needed	to	achieve	a	wide	range	of	ends	whatever	they	may	be.”	The	revised	edition	of	A	Theory	of	Justice	(1999)	almost	exactly	preserves	the	first	edition’s	introduction	of	primary	goods:	“For	simplicity,	assume	that	the	chief	primary	goods	at	the	disposition	of	society	are	rights	and	liberties,	powers	and	opportunities,	income	and	wealth.	(Later	on	in	Part	Three	the	primary	good	of	self-respect	has	a	central	place.)	These	are	the	social	primary	goods.	Other	primary	goods	such	as	health	and	vigor,	intelligence	and	imagination,	are	natural	goods;	although	their	possession	is	influenced	by	the	basic	structure,	they	are	not	so	directly	under	its	control.”	(1971,	54)	
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central	constitutional	principles.”	(2000,	12;	see	also,	2002;	2003)	New	detail	in	political	and	legal	theory	arises	in	writing	from	2006	forward,	as	Nussbaum	articulates	her	account	in	light	of	Rawls’	Political	Liberalism	and	remarks	that	“One	way	of	thinking	about	the	capabilities	list	is	to	think	of	it	as	embodied	in	a	list	of	constitutional	guarantees,	in	something	analogous	to	the	Indian	Constitution	or	the	(shorter)	Bill	of	Rights	of	the	U.S.	Constitution.”	(2006,	6,	155)	Nussbaum’s	constitutional	argument	might	be	taken	to	have	reached	full	maturity	as	she	presents	it	to	U.S.	jurists,	highlighting	an	Aristotelian	thread	in	the	fabric	of	the	modern	legal	tradition,	in	a	Harvard	Law	Review	article	of	2007:	For	several	centuries,	an	approach	to	the	foundation	of	basic	political	principles	that	draws	its	key	insights	from	Aristotle	and	the	ancient	Greek	and	Roman	Stoics	has	played	a	role	in	shaping	European	and	American	conceptions	of	the	proper	role	of	government,	the	purpose	of	constitution-making,	and	the	nature	of	basic	constitutional	entitlements.	This	normative	approach,	the	“Capability	Approach”	(CA),	holds	that	a	key	task	of	a	nation’s	constitution,	and	the	legal	tradition	that	interprets	it,	is	to	secure	for	all	citizens	the	prerequisites	of	a	life	worthy	of	human	dignity	—	a	core	group	of	“capabilities”	—	in	areas	of	central	importance	to	human	life.	(2007,	7;	see	also	56-73;	fn.	15)		 What	was	developed	in	1987	as	a	list	of	characteristics	of	“humanness”	coupled	with	Aristotle’s	views	of	the	role	of	the	“legislator”	in	their	cultivation,	then,	has	developed	into	normative	claims	about	entitlements	within	national	constitutions	(1987,	47).	Nussbaum’s	thought	evolves	from	political	theory	to	claims	about	actual	governance,	yielding	a	list	that	would	eventually	be	directed	as	much	to	practicing	legislators	as	to	academic	philosophers.	This	political	ideal	provides	a	specific	role	for	the	philosopher	in	political	discussion	(2000,	104),	presented	in	the	“contention	that	the	capabilities	are	a	template	for	constitution-making	or	for	constitutional	entitlements	in	nations	without	a	written	constitution.”	(2014,	4)		 Amartya	Sen	has	at	times	greatly	overstated	Nussbaum’s	claims	regarding	both	characteristics	and	uses	of	such	a	list	of	central	capabilities.	Sen	worries	over	the	possibility	of	its	use	as	a	piece	of	“pure	theory”	in	“a	cemented	list	of	capabilities,	which	is	absolutely	complete	(nothing	could	be	added	to	it)	and	totally	fixed	(it	
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could	not	respond	to	public	reasoning	and	to	the	formation	of	social	values).”	(2004,	78)	Some	of	Nussbaum’s	own	words	may	point	to	such	interpretation:	the	expression	“template”	suggest	as	much,	as	does	an	early	article,	“Human	functioning	and	social	justice:	In	defense	of	Aristotelian	essentialism,”	which	purports	to	characterize	over	five	pages	“the	shape	of	the	human	form	of	life”	(1992,	216-21).	Even	within	that	presentation,	however,	Nussbaum	also	presents	her	“essentialist	proposal”	as	“a	thick	vague	theory	of	the	good”	–	so	it	is	“theory”	(and	not	“cemented”)	and	it	is	vague,	“deliberately	so	...	for	...	it	admits	of	much	multiple	specification	in	accordance	with	varied	local	and	personal	conceptions.”	(Nussbaum	1992,	215;	and	see	Keleher	2014,	25-8)	Sen	would	prefer	that	simple	openness	replace	such	flexibility:	“public	discussion	and	reasoning	can	lead	to	a	better	understanding	of	the	role,	reach,	and	the	significance	of	particular	capabilities.”	(Sen	2004,	79)	He	also	holds	that	“some	of	the	basic	capabilities	(with	which	my	1979	Tanner	Lecture	was	particularly	concerned)	will	no	doubt	figure	in	every	list	of	relevant	capabilities	in	every	society,”	so	Sen	also	has	a	list	–	his	concern	lies	in	its	proposal	in	the	political	forum	(Sen	2004,	79).		 David	Crocker	is	also	concerned	especially	with	the	list’s	influence	upon	the	function	of	public	reasoning.	It	is	a	philosopher’s	intrusion,	a	prior	theory	that	encumbers	the	theory-practice	of	politics:	he	writes,	“while	philosophical	dialogue	aims	solely	at	the	truth	or	at	least	at	reasoned	agreement	on	beliefs	and	values,	in	democratic	deliberation	fellow	citizens	deliberate	over,	decide	on,	and	bind	themselves	to	problem-solving	policies	that	most	(all)	can	accept.”	(2008,	199)	In	the	context	of	the	creation	of	national	constitutions,	“people	have	the	right	and	responsibility	to	form	collective	values	and	decide	practical	policies	together.”(	208-9,	and	see	196ff.)	These	concerns	continue	a	line	of	thought	from	much	earlier	in	his	writing,	the	view	that	we	ought	to	elucidate	“valuational	dimensions...	in	ways	appropriate	to	any	basic	beliefs	–	through	critical	dialogue.”	(1991b,	467)			 Crocker,	then,	has	doubts	about	the	philosopher’s	assumed	role,	and	about	the	approach	from	a	“template.”	His	attention	continues	to	focus	on	the	shapes	that	power	takes	within	hierarchies	and	groups	and	on	the	possibilities	for	improvement	
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offered	by	individual	agency,	participatory	democracy,	and	development	work.	In	such	criticism,	born	of	work	spanning	three	decades,	we	find	a	distillation	of	what	has	made	Crocker’s	effort	distinctive	and	especially	valuable	as	a	contribution	to	the	characterization	of	development	and	its	ethical	practice.	Crocker’s	early	focus	within	Marxist	humanism	laid	the	ground	for	his	challenge	to	Nussbaum’s	approach	to	framing	constitutions.	This	chapter	will	extend	the	challenge,	following	a	foray	into	axiology.	
	
Liberal	individualism,	relational	autonomy,	and	dialectical	change		 “Collective	values”	and	“shared	values”	are	expressions	that	are	familiar	enough.	They	are	often	meant	to	indicate	that	members	of	a	group	arrive	at	a	condition	that	each	individual	agrees	to	or	tacitly	admits	to,	perhaps	through	consensus,	democratic	politics,	or	continuation	of	a	practice.6	A	group	of	friends	agrees	to	watch	one	movie	that	some	prefer	tonight,	planning	to	re-assemble	another	day	for	the	option	preferred	by	the	others;	a	legislator	convinces	her	party	to	vote	for	and	pass	a	bill;	I	see	the	point	of	laws	that	keep	traffic	on	the	right	side	of	the	road	–	these	are	cases	that	display	the	presence	of	values	that	reflect	our	choices	for	coordination	and	for	collective	decision-making.			 In	some	cases,	the	values	we	arrive	at	have	a	distinctive	property:	they	would	not	otherwise	have	been	conceived	by	any	of	the	individuals	among	us,	but	for	the	activity	of	the	group,	or	of	a	group	in	the	past.	An	example	developed	later	in	this	chapter	presents	the	possibility	that	individuals	within	different	cultures	may	understand	relationships	to	nature	in	very	different	ways	that	are	“incompatible”	(Cortez	2014,	337).	Such	incompatibility	suggests	that,	to	explain	the	difference,	a	story	needs	to	be	told	about	the	way	individuals	in	the	cultures	think	of	value,	and	an	account	explaining	the	fact	of	what	they	value	will	say	too	little.	To	explain	both	value	and	fact,	the	story	would	have	to	consider	the	history	of	people	interacting,	
																																																						6	David	Gauthier’s	Morals	by	agreement	was	a	particularly	clear	attempt	at	analyzing	value	along	these	lines,	with	the	goal	of	“showing	why	an	individual,	reasoning	from	non-moral	premises,	would	accept	the	constraints	of	morality	on	his	choices.”	(1986,	5)	
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with	different	histories	informing	different	values	for	various	people.	Such	history	of	cultures	may	explain	how	value	is	conceived,	as	well	as	indicate	what	is	valued.7	So,	there	is	a	second	sense	in	which	these	particular	values	are	collective:	they	are	born	of	collective	activity	that	goes	beyond	being	agreed	upon	by	a	collectivity	of	individuals.		 I	suggest	that	values	relevant	to	adequate	political	and	development	theory	are	created	as	historical	products	of	interaction	that	is	not	just	agreement	among	individuals.	To	articulate	this	view	I	will	draw	from	Carol	Gould’s	formulation	of	feminist	relational	theory	and	Denis	Goulet’s	development	theory.	I	will	invoke	a	familiar	theory	of	process	and	say	that	values	are	dialectical	products,	or	(better)	dialectical	processes,	since	they	may	continue	to	change.	The	products,	but	not	the	processes,	are	acknowledged	within	the	reasoning	and	agreements	at	the	focus	of	liberal	theories,	but	accounting	for	the	values	of	individuals	in	this	way	will	not	provide	a	sufficiently	comprehensive	account	of	the	political	process	that	allows	us	to	discern	just	political	arrangements	or	ethical	development.	Modern	liberal	theorists	since	Immanuel	Kant,	however,	do	generally	maintain	that	agreement	by	individuals,	under	appropriate	conditions,	will	suffice.	I	argue	that	such	a	modern	conception	gives	too	slight	a	regard	to	the	social	processes	from	which	values	that	would	not	otherwise	have	come	to	be	recognized	are	dialectically	produced,	and	it	may,	as	a	result,	yield	too	spare	a	treatment	of	public	reasoning.		 Kant	presents	the	paradigm	formulation	of	the	modern	assumption	that	the	autonomous	individual	is	of	value,	beginning	the	Groundwork	of	the	Metaphysics	of	
Morals	with	the	claim,	“It	is	impossible	to	think	of	anything	at	all	in	the	world,	or	indeed	even	beyond	it,	that	could	be	considered	good	without	limitation	except	a	good	will.”	(4:393)	The	individual	discerns	value	through	practical	reason,	which	generates	a	maxim	that	reflects	Kant’s	opening	claim	(4:420-1,	footnotes).	The	person	of	good	will	subjectively	recognizes	the	absolute	value	of	each	will	by	
																																																						7	On	“fact”	and	“value”	in	this	paragraph,	see	Putnam	2002,	96-98.	On	taking	values	as	historical	products,	see	Putnam	2016,	Chapter	3,	especially	p.	63.	The	“incompatibility”	between	two	cultures	I	mention	is	not	intended	to	imply	that	incompatibilities	in	value	cannot	be	reconciled:	if	fact	and	value	are	entangled,	experience	and	discussion	might	reconcile	divergence.	
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observing	rational	limits	upon	individual	activity;	the	modern	state	presents	an	“objective”	solution	to	such	problems	of	encroachment	(Metaphysics	of	Morals,	6:307-311;	see	also	Perpetual	Peace,	8:349).	Those	rational	limits	are	the	transmuted	remnants	of	the	ideal	of	interpersonal	agreement	that	is	found	in	the	social	contract	tradition	prior	to	Kant:	his	rational	grounding	for	the	state	rejects	both	the	historical	fiction	of	the	agreement	that	dissolves	the	state	of	nature	in	Hobbes	and	the	explicit	contract	suggested	by	Rousseau.	Instead,	Kant	holds	that	the	“ethical	law-giving”	of	the	individual	will	determines	“morality”	and	its	law.	The	process	is	“internal”	and	subjective,	and	it	underwrites	“external	lawgiving”:	it	provides	the	basis	of	“right,”	which	is	“the	external	and	indeed	practical	relation	of	one	person	to	another,	insofar	as	their	actions,	as	deeds,	can	have	(direct	or	indirect)	influence	on	each	other.”	(6:219,	6:230)	The	state	is	that	external	or	objective	lawgiving:	“a	system	of	laws	for	a	people	...	[who]	need	a	rightful	condition	under	a	will	uniting	them,	a	constitution,	so	they	may	enjoy	what	is	laid	down	as	right.”	(6:306,	6:311)	This	is	an	atomization	of	the	older	social	contract	model	of	political	relations,	reducing	interpersonal	agreement	to	the	pure	practical	reasoning	of	each	individual.	Kant	also	holds	that	the	state	is	a	“moral	person.”	Though	it	is	not	actually	composed	through	agreement,	it	is	not	a	mere	fiction;	it	is	an	entity,	a	“society	of	human	beings	that	no-one	other	than	itself	can	command	or	dispose	of”	(8:344).	Kant’s	state	is	an	image	of	the	Leviathan,	Hobbes’	artificial	person	that	is	produced	by	agreement	and	able	“to	submit	their	wills,	every	one	to	his	will.”	But	in	Kant	the	genuinely	social	remnant	of	the	contract	has	disappeared:	political	theory	and	ethics	become	the	purview	of	autonomous	individuals	as	each	submits	to	law	that	is	the	individual’s	own	lawful	willing.	I	need	only	check	with	myself	and	I	need	not	contract	with	others:	this	is	the	case	for	each	autonomous,	reasoning	individual	who	operates	as	legislator	within	“the	kingdom	of	ends”	(4:432-433).		 The	places	Kant	gives	to	the	state	and	its	constitution	in	the	passages	just	noted	indicate	how	liberal	theories	generally	continue	to	treat	the	apportioning	of	value	(to	individuals),	the	conferral	of	value	(by	individuals)	and	the	discernment	of	shared	value	(by	individuals	who	generate	agreements)	(e.g.,	Korsgaard	2009,	123,	
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157).	The	political	sphere	is	taken	foremost	as	a	space	for	ensuring	that	the	individual	is	treated	fairly,	or	is	treated	with	dignity.	Acting	within	the	political	sphere,	we	individuals	agree	to	and	commit	to	freedoms	and	entitlements	for	all;	or,	in	Kant’s	terms,	each	of	us	legislates	for	himself	or	herself	within	the	kingdom	of	ends.	John	Rawls	carries	the	Kantian	tradition	forward	by	carefully	disentangling	political	theory	from	Kant’s	metaphysics,	arriving	at	the	position	of	“political	liberalism.”	For	Rawls,	“the	constitution	is	seen	as	a	just	political	procedure	which	incorporates	the	equal	political	liberties	and	seeks	to	assure	their	fair	value	so	that	the	processes	of	political	decision	are	open	to	all	on	a	roughly	equal	basis.”	(1993,	99-116,	337)	Nussbaum	draws	these	threads	into	her	own	thoughts	on	constitutions	and	the	Capability	Approach.			 Within	liberal	political	theory,	then,	the	focus	rests	upon	freedoms	for	individuals	and	agreements	that	are	attuned	to	reasoning	by	and	deliberation	among	individuals.	I	think	it	is	not	misleading	to	rephrase	this	as	the	claim	that	individuals	are	the	subjects	of	political	theory,	or	are	fundamental	as	the	subjects	countenanced	within	just	politics;	that	is,	value	is	conceived	and	understood	by	the	individual,	judged	to	belong	to	just	social	arrangements	through	employment	of	a	capacity	for	practical	reasoning	by	the	individual,	and	evaluation	occurs	in	reference	to	the	good	of	individual	humans,	and	perhaps	also	other	sentient	creatures.			 I	propose	an	alternative	account.	First,	at	least	some	value	is	collective	in	the	second	(dialectical)	sense	outlined	at	the	start	of	this	section.	Second,	an	alternative	account	of	the	subject	within	political	theory	can	be	paired	with	such	a	theory	of	value:	an	account	that	takes	each	subject	not	as	an	autonomous	will,	but	as	an	individual-in-relations.	I	will	note	two	sources	for	such	an	account.	Carol	Gould’s	social	ontology	challenges	the	liberal	conception	of	the	individual,	replacing	it	with	the	individual-in-relations.	Denis	Goulet’s	dialectical	theory	of	development	implicitly	presents	an	account	of	the	creation	of	value	through	social	processes.	For	the	purposes	of	political	theory,	these	two	modifications	may	be	required	to	assess	justice.	They	may	similarly	be	required	to	assess	development.		
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Carol	Gould	on	autonomy	and	Denis	Goulet	on	dialectical	change		 Carol	Gould’s	Interactive	Democracy	presents	an	account	of	the	individual’s	place	within	just	political	arrangements.	Gould	draws	upon	recent	work	in	feminist	relational	theory,	a	generalized	and	theoretically	attuned	descendant	of	care	ethics.8	Before	approaching	Gould’s	account,	consider	an	explanation	of	the	relational	character	of	the	individual	and	her	responsibilities	within	care	ethics,	authored	by	Selma	Sevenhuijsen:		
The	ethics	of	care	starts	from	the	recognition	that	care	is	a	moral	practice,	a	disposition,	a	daily	need,	and	a	way	of	living.	In	opposition	to	individualism	and	neo-liberalism	it	acknowledges	vulnerability,	interconnectedness,	dependency	embodiment	and	finitude	as	basic	characteristics	of	human	life.	(Sevenhuijsen)	The	individual,	for	the	purposes	of	ethical	theory,	is	understood	within	the	context	of	such	relations	of	connection	to	others.	This	is	the	starting	assumption	for	an	account	of	relational	autonomy:	autonomous	activity	is	pursued	in	a	context,	and	in	that	context	the	individual’s	possibilities	for	choice	are	tied	to	embodiment	and	to	others’	choices.	Sevenhuijsen	continues:	
[The	ethics	of	care]	develops	a	set	of	values	and	virtues	about	how	to	deal	with	this	in	a	potentially	wide	range	of	practices,	from	child	care	and	care	for	the	elderly,	to	psychiatry,	economy	and	international	relations.	It	acknowledges	the	contribution	of	all	the	participants	in	caring	practices	in	the	deliberation	about	what	constitutes	a	good	life	and	good	care	and	about	the	practical	conditions	of	its	provision.	Care	ethics	displays	values	that	appear	particularly	in	caregiving	and	in	women’s	lives.	Care	is	of	political	relevance:	as	the	call	of	second	wave	feminism	reminds	us,	the	personal	is	political.	Sevenhuijsen	concludes	her	gloss	with	a	call	to	reform	politics:	“Of	course	this	implies	a	normative	position	in	itself:	caring	about	care	implies	democratic	and	inclusive	forms	of	deliberation	and	a	broad	notion	of	citizenship.”	(Sevenhuijsen)	
																																																						8	For	an	introduction	to	feminist	relational	theory	that	pertains	to	the	account	in	this	chapter,	see	Gould	and	see	especially	the	“Introduction”	and	the	essay	by	Linda	Barclay,	“Autonomy	and	the	social	self,”	in	Mackenzie	&	Stoljar,	2000.		
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	 Care	ethics	enriches	liberal	political	theory	by	displaying	how	choices	and	relations	are	informed	by	values	that	are	neglected	in	non-relational	framings	of	human	well-being,	goodness,	and	justice.	The	social	arrangements	that	reflect	women’s	activities	contribute	to	shaping	the	rights-holder,	or	the	subject	within	liberal	theories	of	justice.	Carol	Gould’s	introduction	of	relational	theory	in	
Interactive	Democracy	extends	Sevenhuijsen’s	line	of		thought,	providing	an	explicit	challenge	to	liberal	theory:	
Going	beyond	liberal	understandings	of	the	individual	(whether	in	terms	of	rational	choice	or	utility	maximization),	the	theory	of	social	reality	(or	social	ontology)	that	underlies	this	work	takes	people	to	be	“individuals-in-relations.”	As	subjects,	they	have	a	capacity	for	freedom,	but	also	require	a	set	of	basic	conditions	to	make	this	freedom	effective,	including	equal	forms	of	social	recognition	and	access	to	the	material	means	of	life.	The	human	rights	that	protect	and	give	expression	to	their	freedom	go	beyond	bare	legal	requirements	to	moral	desiderata;	they	serve	as	goals	for	developing	political,	economic,	and	social	institutions	that	would	help	to	fulfill	them.	(Gould,	2014,	3)	Gould	indicates	in	the	first	sentence	that	the	liberal	understanding	of	the	individual	may	be	an	inadequate	concept	for	politics.	She	situates	human	rights	as	both	ends	and	means,	since	they	may	create	some	of	the	conditions	for	their	own	realization.	She	is	also	expressing	a	political	approach	that	is	familiar	from	Marx:	the	analysis	of	the	conditions	for	the	maintenance	of	political	order,	or	the	conditions	for	a	reproduction	of	society	over	time,	either	as	a	dynamic	or	as	a	static	(unchanging)	social	order.		 Gould’s	re-conception	of	individuals	as	individuals-in-relations	presents	a	radical	critique	of	the	modern	liberal	conception	of	the	individual	as	the	subject	of	politics.	Women’s	practices	marked	by	caring	relations	are	among	the	institutions	of	society	that	produce	the	conditions	under	which	people	gain	their	capacity	for	freedom.	Gould	also	slips	the	expression	“developing”	into	her	explanation:	though	she	is	writing	about	social	ontology,	she	may	also	be	indicating	that	value	is	produced	dialectically.	The	institutions	we	navigate	may	inform	our	understanding	of	freedom,	since	values	to	which	individuals	aspire	are	products	of	the	social	
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conditions	in	which	the	individuals	find	themselves.	As	Georg	Lukács	explained,	“It	is	not	men's	consciousness	that	determines	their	existence,	but	on	the	contrary,	their	social	existence	that	determines	their	consciousness.”	(1972,	18)		 The	idea	that	both	value	itself	and	the	freedom	to	achieve	what	one	values	are	generated	through	social	processes	has	also	been	articulated	in	the	context	of	development	theory	by	Denis	Goulet.	Central	to	his	account	of	development	is	the	moment	of	recognition	of	difference	and	vulnerability	that	arises	from	the	comparison	of	one’s	own	condition	with	that	of	another.	Goulet’s	explanation	is	implicitly	patterned	on	the	dialectic	of	master	and	slave;	he	refers	to	the	dialectical	moment	of	recognition	as	“the	shock	of	underdevelopment,”	suggesting	that	a	shock	of	realization	that	occurs	when	one	is	faced	with	another	produces	the	condition	within	which	the	individual	conceives	of	new	possibilities	for	living	(1971,	26).	This	leads	to	a	collective	condition	that	may	then	create	political	change	in	the	process	of	development:		
Once	they	become	conscious	of	the	meaning	of	their	situation	of	deprivation,	masses	throughout	the	world	begin	thinking	in	explicitly	political	terms.	This	happens	in	all	serious	efforts	at	cultural	mobilization.	...They	now	begin	to	experience	their	condition	as	unnecessary	vulnerability	in	the	face	of	death,	disease,	hunger	and	the	quest	for	dignity	and	freedom	to	control	their	own	destinies.	(1971,	42-44)	Goulet’s	account	is	implicitly	patterned	on	Marx’s	idea	of	class	consciousness,	the	situation	of	a	group	coming	to	realize	that	it	is	a	“class	for	itself.”	His	point,	with	the	Nineteenth	Century	trappings	removed,	is	that	new	understanding	that	could	not	otherwise	become	available	arises	through	human	interaction,	and	political	change	that	is	development	arises	through	such	understanding.			 If,	as	Gould	argues,	social	and	material	conditions	produce	the	subject	of	politics	and	if,	as	Goulet	argues,	the	ability	to	conceive	of	new	possibilities	is	the	product	of	social	interaction,	then	political	approaches	that	neglect	such	interaction	and	such	conditions	will	be	prone	to	disregard	aspects	that	are	of	importance	to	development.	To	close	this	chapter,	I	will	try	to	explain	these	concerns	in	the	context	
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of	Nussbaum’s	suggestion	of	a	role	for	a	list	of	central	capabilities	as	a	“template	for	constitution-making.”			
Central	capabilities,	important	capabilities,	and	constitutional	guarantees	Nussbaum	has	clear	and	excellent	reasons	for	demanding	that	central	capabilities	should	find	their	image	within	law:	she	wishes	to	ensure	“fundamental	political	entitlements”	that	reflect	dignity,	she	wishes	to	ensure	these	through	liberal	democratic	processes,	and	she	is	aware	that	politics	occurs	in	the	context	of	struggles	within	which	some	are	at	a	disadvantage	–	especially	minority	groups	within	nations	and	women	around	the	globe	(2011,	19,	71-73).	Nussbaum	finds	use	for	the	language	of	rights,	as	opposed	to	capabilities,	in	politics,	since,	“To	say	‘Here’s	a	list	of	things	that	people	ought	to	be	able	to	do	and	to	be’	has	only	vague	normative	resonance.	To	say	‘Here’s	a	list	of	fundamental	rights’	is	more	rhetorically	direct.”	(2000,	100;	see	also	2011,	68)	And	she	finds	merit	in	situating	rights	within	slowly-evolving	foundational	documents	–	state	constitutions	that	enumerate	freedoms	“central	for	political	purposes”	and	that	provide	“supramajoritarian	protection”	against	“majority	whim”	(2011,	72,	73;	and	see	2016b).			 As	Crocker	notes,	Nussbaum	tends	to	place	the	responsibility	for	determining	such	protections	with	politicians	working	in	consultation	with	philosophers.	Philosophers	provide	“the	philosophical	underpinnings	for	an	account	of	basic	constitutional	principles	that	should	be	respected	and	implemented	by	the	governments	of	all	nations,	as	a	bare	minimum	of	what	respect	for	human	dignity	requires.”	(Nussbaum	2000,	5;	see	also	Crocker	2008,	162;	197-199)	Nussbaum	has	taken	the	position	that	“Citizens	can	deliberate	about	the	fundamental	political	principles	for	which	they	want	their	nation	to	stand	–	if	they	are	framing	a	new	constitution,	for	example”	(2011,	74),	but	she	also	frequently	places	politicians,	as	representatives	of	the	people,	in	this	role	(2000,	104;	2016b,	303;	see	also	Crocker	2008,	199-200;	207-9).		Here	the	focus	will	be	upon	possibilities	that	may	be	foregone	if	philosophers’	lists	and	politicians’	interpretations	obviate	or	dominate	
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popular	voices	within	constitutional	conversations.	Public	discussion	might	unearth	ideals	of	“minimal	social	justice”	(Nussbaum	2011,	73)	that	stand	as	alternatives	to	those	noted	by	democratically	elected	politicians	or	listed	by	any	philosopher.	One	problem,	which	relational	theorists	would	affirm,	is	that	the	politicians	may	be	insufficiently	aware	of	all	parties’	concerns	if	they	are	not	required	to	engage	in	ongoing	consultation	and,	indeed,	in	ongoing	critical	dialogue	with	those	parties.	A	second	and	more	telling	problem	lies	with	essentialism:	if	value	is	a	social	product,	the	essentialist	(or	the“thick	and	vague”	theorist	of	the	good)	will	be	unaware	of	possibilities	that	arise	through	dialectical	processes,	such	as	critical	dialogue.	The	emergence	of	new	possibilities	not	previously	understood	may	even	be	hampered	by	discussion	that	is	structured	at	the	outset	by	a	list	of	central	capabilities	for	framing	a	constitution.		 A	new	term	may	be	useful	that	allows	for	distance	from	the	essentialist	position.	I	propose	that	some	capabilities	are	like	those	Nussbaum	refers	to	as	“central”:	they	should	be	recognized	as	of	highest	importance	in	understanding	well-being	once	they	are	grasped,	and	many	of	them	will	deserve	constitutional	guarantee.	These	are	capabilities	that	come	into	being	because	(1)	critical	dialogue	will	unearth	some	of	them,	(2)	economic	and	social	conditions	will	make	others	possible,	and	(3)	political	contest	will	create	others	still.	I	will	refer	to	these	simply	as	“important”	capabilities	that	are	also	salient	to	national	constitutions.	Such	important	capabilities	might,	following	their	recognition,	be	incorporated	as	new	material	under	one	of	the	ten	central	capabilities	of	Nussbaum’s	list.	But	some	of	these	important	capabilities,	as	I	will	argue	at	the	end	of	this	section,	would	not	have	appeared	upon	any	thick	and	vague	list	that	had	previously	been	offered	by	a	philosopher,	or	would	not	have	been	generated	through	discussion	with	a	philosopher.	Some	of	them	might	not	be	successfully	subsumed	and	so	may	serve	to	destabilize	a	list	of	central	capabilities.	Dialectical	processes	may	send	some	capabilities	out	of	the	constitutional	orbit,	bring	new	ones	into	being,	and	bring	them	into	that	orbit.	Important	capabilities	present	a	challenge,	then,	to	essentialism,	or	to	a	thick	vague	theory	of	the	good,	because	we	learn	what	is	of	
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value,	including	what	should	be	included	in	a	political	constitution,	through	experience	of	the	facts	and	through	processes	of	political	struggle.			 Thorough	defense	of	these	claims	would	require	another	paper,	so,	for	this	chapter,	what	must	suffice	is	an	explanation	of	how	the	link	of	central	capabilities	to	constitutions	might	be	effectively	replaced	with	an	account	that	refers	instead	to	important	capabilities	(that	is,	evolving,	non-essential	ones).	Some	cases	regarding	the	creation	and	alteration	of	constitutions	are	included	to	indicate	that	these	concerns	are	not	merely	abstract.			 I	begin	from	the	assumption	that	a	national	constitution	need	not	enumerate	all	central	or	important	capabilities	that	are	necessary	for	the	well-being	of	the	people:	neither	all	of	Nussbaum’s	central	capabilities,	nor	all	of	what	I	call	important	capabilities	that	are	appropriate	for	a	given	time,	need	be	treated	in	legal	rights.	Instead,	as	other	philosophers	have	suggested,	“specific	human	rights	respond	to	familiar	and	recurrent	threats	to	fundamental	human	interests”	(Nickel	2007,	3);	similarly,	rights	may	also	include	commitments	to	accessible	opportunities	for	advancement	of	human	flourishing,	as	is	the	case,	for	example,	in	the	right	to	education.	What	has	frequently	found	its	way	into	constitutions	in	the	past	and	what	belongs	within	planning	for	a	new	constitution,	I	suggest,	is	language	that	addresses	familiar	recurrent	threats	and	accessible	opportunities.		 Threats	are	addressed	through	rights,	but	new	threats	arise	under	particular	historical	conditions	and	old	ones	depart.	A	new	constitution	should	reflect	its	era	and	an	old	one	should	be	rewritten,	or	should	track	history	through	amendments.	For	an	example	of	a	new	threat,	the	legal	right	to	privacy	appears	to	be	a	recent	and	developing	innovation	in	response	to	such	threat	(Clapham	2016,	113-20).	The	suggestion	that	a	state	should	ensure	“provisions	for	a	zone	of	personal	privacy”	(Nussbaum	2011,	40)	may	be	one	that	is	appropriate	in	some	historical	conditions—from	the	era	of	ubiquity	for	printing	presses	and	up	to	present	–	and	not	in	others.	This	is	not	to	say	that	abuse	of	privacy	is	acceptable	in	other	circumstances;	rather,	there	may	be	circumstances	in	which	a	government	cannot	or	need	not	play	the	role	of	guarantor,	since,	once	again,	“specific	human	rights	
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respond	to	familiar	and	recurrent	threats	to	fundamental	human	interests.”	New	important	capabilities	will	also	come	into	being	in	future.	For	example,	no	capability	for	access	to	the	internet	existed	before	the	latter	half	of	the	20th	Century,	and	the	capability	did	not	become	an	important	one,	in	the	sense	intended	here,	before	perhaps	the	21st	Century.	That	capability	may	now	rate	as	important,	as	emerging	international	and	national	norms	suggest	(UN	2003;	UN	2015,	9.c;	Ecuador	2008,	Article	16.2).			 Among	currently	accessible	opportunities	is	“an	adequate	education,	including,	but	by	no	means	limited	to,	literacy	and	basic	mathematical	and	scientific	training.”	(Nussbaum	2011,	33)	Education	is	thus	incorporated	under	Nussbaum’s	fourth	central	capability,	“Being	able	to	use	the	senses,	to	imagine,	think	and	reason.”	Education	was	framed	as	a	responsibility	of	the	state	by	Aristotle,	as	Nussbaum	notes	(Nussbaum	1987,	21),	but	it	has	only	recently	been	treated	as	a	guarantee	for	all	people,	since	such	education	is	made	possible	in	certain	economic	and	social	conditions	that	have	only	recently	arrived.	A	right	to	universal	education	probably	could	not	have	been	supported	as	a	state	responsibility	before	the	Twentieth	Century,	except	in	a	very	limited	number	of	cases.	For	perspective	on	this	choice	of	date,	consider	national	and	global	advances	in	popular	education.	England,	which	was	a	European	leader	alongside	Netherlands,	achieved	50%	literacy	for	men	about	1650,	and	the	same	for	women	about	1850	(Clark,	179).	Over	the	century	leading	up	to	1900	the	world	literacy	rate	is	estimated	to	have	about	doubled,	reaching	21%.	State	guarantees	demand	particular	social	conditions,	such	as	a	sufficiency	of	literate	people	to	both	run	the	state	and	provide	universal	education.	Though	Cuba’s	1961	literacy	campaign	provides	a	shining	example	of	rapid	improvement	as	Cuba	increased	its	literacy	to	beyond	96%	in	just	nine	months,	it	began	its	campaign	with	an	85%	literacy	rate,	according	to	one	of	the	program’s	architects	(Prieto	1981,	221).	Consider	India’s	case:	efforts	at	establishing	a	right	to	education	date	at	least	from	1910,	but	the	right	to	education	only	came	to	be	recognized	in	India’s	courts	more	than	80	years	later,	and	the	clause	“the	State	shall	provide	free	and	compulsory	education”	was	inserted	into	India’s	Constitution	as	
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article	21a	in	2002	(Selva	2009).	The	ideal	of	a	right	to	education	was	expressed	as	Article	26	of	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	(UDHR)	in	1948,	so	it	appears	that	it	was	available	at	the	drafting	of	India’s	Constitution	in	1950,	but	was	set	aside.	Though	capabilities	refer	to	what	people	deserve,	constitutions	refer	to	what	states	can	deliver,	and	they	should	reflect	the	maximum	of	important	capabilities	states	can	be	expected	deliver	(see	also,	Crocker	2008,	205).	Constitutions	might	sensibly	be	limited	to	justiciable	guarantees,	or	might	add	directive	principles	for	courts	(McLean	2009,	7-14),	or	further	add	directive	principles	for	policy,	as	India	did	for	education	in	1950,	leaving	further	aspiration	aside	(India,	39,	41).		 The	above	sketch	indicates	how	a	changing	set	of	important	capabilities	might	take	the	place	of	central	capabilities	and	how	constitutions	may	be	limited	to	contain	less	than	a	full	set	of	important	capabilities.	A	greater	concern	for	approaching	a	constitution	with	a	list	in	hand	is	that	philosophers	–	and	representatives,	too	–	may	not	be	in	a	position	to	identify	rights	that	are	important	to	members	of	groups	to	which	they	do	not	belong.	I	have	in	mind	political	struggles	in	which	individuals	come	to	understand	their	group	identity	through	struggle.	Before	they	have	self-identified	as	a	group,	the	individuals	may	experience	their	social	exclusion	as	dysphoria,	or	they	may	adapt	their	preferences	instead	of	grasping	that	a	lack	of	appropriate	entitlements	is	the	source	of	their	malaise,	and	they	may	not	be	capable	of	identifying	or	articulating	their	demands	for	rights	until	the	political	process	is	under	way.	A	well-documented	case	of	such	dialectical	development	is	the	homophile	movement	of	USA,	a	political	effort	that	played	out	from	the	1940’s	up	to	the	period	of	gay	activism	starting	with	the	1969	Stonewall	riots	(Faderman	2015,	53-113).	In	such	a	situation,	I	think,	both	political	representatives	and	thoughtful	philosophers	may	fail	to	identify	the	concern,	or	might	identify	the	concern	as	pathological.	That	is	to	say:	a	list	might	be	of	no	help,	or	might	be	routinely	interpreted	by	philosophers	and	representatives	in	ways	that	obscure	others’	concerns,	dissipating	class	consciousness.	
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	 For	a	constitutional	case,	consider	Ecuador’s	national	interpretation	of	the	“Rights	of	the	good	way	of	living	(buen	vivir)”	articulated	within	its	recently	adopted	Constitution	(Ecuador	2008,	Preamble).	Ecuador	also	frames	this	conception	as	“sumak	kawsay,”	a	Kichwa	dialect	term.	Eduardo	Gudynas	characterizes	sumak	
kawsay	as	“fullness	of	life	in	a	community	together	with	other	persons	and	Nature,”	in	which	“Nature	becomes	a	subject;	human	beings	as	the	only	source	of	values	are	therefore	displaced.”	(442,	445)	As	sumak	kawsay	is	articulated	in	the	constitution,	it	entails	“rights	of	nature,”	including	“the	right	to	integral	respect	for	its	existence	and	for	the	maintenance	and	regeneration	of	its	life	cycles,	structure,	functions	and	evolutionary	processes.”	Nature	also	has	a	“right	to	be	restored”	(Ecuador,	Articles	71,	72,	83).	Each	person	has	rights	to	live	“in	harmony	with	nature”	and	has	attendant	individual	duties	to	“respect	the	rights	of	nature,	preserve	a	healthy	environment	and	use	natural	resources	rationally,	sustainably	and	durably	...	in	harmonious	coexistence	with	nature.”	(27,	83;	see	also	275)		 This	matrix	of	rights	and	responsibilities	may	suggest	that	Ecuador’s	Constitution	supports	a	central	capability	that	Nussbaum	characterizes	as	“being	able	to	live	with	concern	for	and	in	relation	to	animals,	plants,	and	the	world	of	nature”	(2011,	34).	But	the	rights	of	nature	and	the	correlate	of	an	individual’s	responsibility	toward	nature	that	are	called	for	in	the	constitution	suggest	that	a	very	different	claim	is	contained	in	this	ideal	of	living	harmoniously	with	nature.	Indeed,	this	ideal	may	not	be	compatible	with	the	liberal	conception	of	the	individual,	since	Kichwa	political	activists	have	explicitly	identified	it	as	a	genuine	departure	from	liberal	conceptions	of	individual	rights	and	of	individualism	(Becker	2011,	48,	51).	Nussbaum	may	have	conceptions	of	buen	vivir	and	deep	ecology	in	mind	in	Creating	Capabilities	as	she	notes	a	“basic	position”	concerning	“animal	entitlements”	to	which	she	does	not	subscribe,	in	which	“Individualism	[of	all	living	organisms]	is	dropped	[and]	the	capabilities	of	systems	(ecosystems	in	particular,	but	also	species)	count	as	ends	in	themselves.”	(158)	Nussbaum	admits	that	she	cannot	yet	make	sense	of	the	position	and	then	she	concludes	“[t]hat	animals	can	suffer	not	just	pain	but	also	injustice	seems,	however,	secure.”	(159)	This	is	a	
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fallback	to	individualism	that	the	Kichwa	activists	would	appear	not	to	find	satisfactory.	So,	I	expect	sumak	kawsay	simply	does	not	fit	within	Nussbaum’s	list.	That	it	is	not	on	the	list	and	does	not	fit	the	list	should	not	be	taken	to	suggest	that	it	is	not	a	capability	that	is	important	in	the	sense	indicated	in	this	chapter.	Indigenous	activists	have	argued	that	sumak	kawsay	is	central	to	their	concept	of	well-being	and	they	credit	its	establishment	in	the	constitution	to	“decades	of	resistance	and	social	movements,	the	indigenous	movement,	and	diverse	sectors	of	the	Ecuadorian	peoples.”	(Becker	2011,	59)		 Debate	has	also	arisen	as	to	the	meaning	of	sumak	kawsay.	Despite	its	presence	in	the	constitution,	the	understanding	of	many	of	those	engaged	in	drafting	the	document	may	have	diverged	greatly	from	the	understanding	of	people	who	received	the	concept	within	its	original	cultural	context.	One	development	expert	and	government	official,	René	Ramírez	Gallegos,	sees	a	close	connection	of	sumak	
kawsay	to	Aristotelian	thought	(Ramírez	2010,	8,	49).	European	academics	Laura	Portela	and	Carmen	Ayerra	have	taken	sumak	kawsay	to	“very	loosely”	approximate	the	concept	of	capability,	but	find	the	concept	of	“ecodependence”	a	better	fit	(Portela	&	Ayerra	2013,	159).	Ecuadorian	philosopher	David	Cortez	cites	native	Kichwa	anthropologist	Carlos	Viteri	Gualinga	to	argue	that	the	constitution’s	treatment	of	sumak	kawsay	as	one	approach	to	buen	vivir	reduces	the	former,	yielding	a	conflation	of	“being	with	Mother	Nature”	and	“conditions	for	social	welfare”	(Cortez	2014,	321;	see	also	Tibán	2000).	Cortez	finds	improvement	upon	“economic	liberalism”	in	the	importance	Nussbaum	gives	to	nature	(326);	nevertheless	he	finds	that	Nussbaum	cleaves	to	“a	western	anthropocentric	system”	and	he	concludes:	the	notion	of	“human	development”	in	the	approach	to	good	living	in	the	[Ecuador]	National	Development	Plans	and	similar	concepts	such	as	"capabilities"	and	"quality	of	life"	found	in	the	readings	of	Amartya	Sen	and	Martha	Nussbaum	reproduce	an	economic	and	political	narrative	that	is	incompatible	with	the	perspective	of	sumak	kawsay,	which	has	lately	emerged	as	a	critique	of	liberal	paradigms.	(326,	337)			 I	do	not	wish	to	suggest	that	the	introduction	of	a	list	of	central	capabilities	such	as	Nussbaum’s	has	in	fact	been	deleterious	to	the	drafting	of	Ecuador’s	
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constitution,	or	to	the	introduction	of	sumak	kawsay	into	its	text.	But	the	turns	of	critical	dialogue	noted	above	suggest	that	a	misunderstanding	has	arisen.	The	familiar	language	of	development	economics,	liberalism	and	capabilities	may	cant	understanding,	where	such	language	frames	discussion.	So	philosophers,	government	officials	and	representatives	with	backgrounds	dissimilar	to	others	within	the	community	may	present	a	“thick,	vague	theory	of	the	good”	that	leaves	too	thin	a	space	for	public	reason,	and	so,	may	obscure	alternatives.	At	the	least,	such	initial	offering	of	language	will	produce	much	greater	demands	upon	those	who	might	hope	to	express	very	different	views	and	values	in	diverse	languages.	If	the	public	forum	is	not	sufficiently	open	then	there	are	hazards	even	in	the	proposal	that	we	view	Nussbaum’s	list	“as	a	stimulus	for	public	debate	in	the	construction,	interpretation,	and	application	of	constitutional	principles.”	(Crocker	2008,	198)		
Conclusion	I	have	argued	that	just	politics	and	politics	in	the	context	of	development	diverge	from	liberal	assumptions	concerning	the	role	that	the	individual	takes	in	conceiving	value.	The	liberal	tradition	slights	the	social,	or	the	relational,	in	its	characterization	of	the	political	subject	within	its	theories	of	justice.	Feminist	relational	theorists	present	a	challenge	to	that	tradition	by	introducing	relational	autonomy	to	supplant	the	liberal	conception	of	individual	autonomy.	Goulet’s	theory	of	development	also	challenges	individualism	as	it	suggests	the	plausible	hypothesis	that	value	is	produced	dialectically	through	social	interaction.		 This	suggests	that	politics	and	development	are	human	and	social:	they	involve	the	creation	of	value	as	a	dialectical	product	of	dependent,	biological	creatures.	That	claim	is	one	made	within	axiology,	theory	of	value,	or	normativity;	it	is	not	a	claim	within	ethics.	Within	ethics,	such	understanding	of	value	underwrites	further	characterization	of	what	we	should	value	to	live	well.	If	value	is	produced	through	social	processes,	then	those	processes	are	also	the	subject	matter	of	ethical	theory.	And	this	concern	finally	reaches	to	development	ethics:	if	the	individual	as	
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political	subject	is	constituted	in	this	way,	and	if	values	are	created	in	this	way,	then	we	can	find	new	reasons	as	to	why	democratic	participation	may	foster	development	and	may	be	the	ethical	choice	for	development	as	well.9		
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